In this article, I show that David Hume’s argument of Section 10 of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding does not encourage dogmatism. Instead, it suggests a program for how to categorically deny the existence of miracles without bringing about the stagnation of science. In recognizing the entailments of Hume’s notion of proof while realizing his commitments regarding the laws of nature, we must acknowledge that miracles are possible. Yet this is consistent with Hume’s claim that we are never justified in (...) believing the testimony affirming them. This conclusion is strengthened when we realize that only a doxastic notion of lawlikeness is at work in Hume’s argument rather than a robust, efficacious notion of metaphysical laws. When properly understood, we see that the course he advocates does not impede the advances of science, as has sometimes been suggested. Instead, Hume’s deliberate use of specific examples of two very different sorts propounds a procedure for dealing with purported miracles that is much richer than merely denying them, and tells us when revisions to our conception of the laws of nature are necessary and when they are not. (shrink)

"Business Ethics and Values" introduces students to the complexities and principles of ethical issues by focusing on developing ethical awareness and the ability to argue business ethics matters. A proven resource, the second edition of this text continues to present a successful blend of concrete issues and academic theory, suitable for undergraduate and postgraduate students with or without practical experience of the world of organisations. It gives as much importance to individual conscience at work as it does to socially responsible (...) behaviour at the corporate level and within the global business world. Hallmark features: Broad coverage of the many issues in this subject ensures that students see the whole picture. The use of real-world case studies and simulations helps to stimulate debate and appreciate the multi-faceted aspects of ethical arguments. New to this edition: New material on the ethics of e-communication, sustainability and the ethical impact of globalisation ensures that students are learning from the most up-to-date material available. Further analysis of Anglo-American approaches to corporate governance and their ethical underpinnings. Short test and assignment questions at the end of each chapter help students to consolidate their learning. More simulation exercises and activities give students the opportunity to reflect on their attitudes to this engaging subject. A well-developed supplements package to support tutors and students includes an instructor's manual, PowerPoint slides and a companion website. Colin Fisher is Professorof Managerial Ethics and Values, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University. Alan Lovell is Professor of Organisational Accountability and Head of the Department of Accounting, Finance & Economics, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University. (shrink)

Rawlsians argue for principles of justice that apply exclusively to the basic structure of society, but it can seem strange that those who accept these principles should not also regulate their choices by them. Valid moral principles should seemingly identify ideals for both institutions and individuals. What justifies this nonintuitive distinction between institutional and individual principles is not a moral division of labor but Rawls’s dual commitments to conventionalism and constructivism. Conventionalism distinguishes the relevant ideals for evaluating institutions from those (...) for evaluating actions, while constructivism explains why this distinction is morally fundamental. (shrink)

Nevertheless, and in spite of these drawbacks, it will be clearly intimated to him that the value of philosophy is, indeed, very great, although it happens ...

The dominant conventionalist view explains the wrong of breaking a promise as failing to do our fair share in supporting the practice of promise-keeping. Yet, this account fails to explain any unique moral standing that a promisee has to demand that the promisor keep the promise. In this paper, I provide a conventionalist response to this problem. In any cooperative practice, participants stand as both beneficiary and contributor. As a beneficiary, they are morally required to follow the rules of the (...) practice. As a contributor, they have claims on other participants to follow the rules. According to the rules of promise-keeping, a promisee has a unique claim on the promisor, and the personal wrong of breaking a promise should be understood as the violation of this unique and practice-dependent claim. (shrink)

Those who teach or are taught medical ethics with a heavy reliance on case studies should be warned first of all that the practice tends to exaggerate the degree to which morality is controversial. Secondly, they ought to realise that it is often quite unclear what problems count as moral problems. Thirdly, they will need to bear in mind that there may be -- and presumably are -- limits to what we may regard as open to discussion. It would be (...) quite superficial to assume that ethics teachers, going along with what is generally accepted by their colleagues in this matter, would never tempt students to disregard these limits. (shrink)

Among the scanty remains of poetry attributed to Eumelus of Corinth two lines 2 stand out as different from the rest, first because they are concerned not with the legendary past but with an actual, present occasion, and secondly because they are composed not for Corinthians but for Messenians. Our evidence comes from Pausanias and may be set out at the start.

To be a conventionalist about a specific obligation or right is to believe that the obligation or right is dependent on the existence of a social practice. A conventionalist about property, for example, believes that a moral right to property is generated by conventional norms rather than by any natural right. One problem with dominant conventionalist theories is that they do not adequately justify conventional moral claims. They can justify why it is wrong to steal, for example, but they do (...) not justify the claim that you have on me to not steal from you. As a remedy, this article develops and defends the Principle of Legitimate Expectations. Suggested by John Rawls, this principle grants individuals a moral claim to what the rules of morally justified practices entitle them. This article addresses common objections to the principle to show how it can ground a wide range of conventional moral claims. (shrink)

Most liberals agree that governments should protect certain basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of the person. Liberals disagree, however, about whether free market rights should also be protected. By “free market rights,” we mean those rights typically associated with laissez-faire economic systems such as freedom of contract, a right to market returns, and claims to privately own the means of production.We do not use the phrase “economic liberties,” as Tomasi does, because it does (...) not distinguish between the “economic rights” defended by classical liberal and those defended by socialists. Those on the right often see such freedoms as core liberal commitments, while those on the left argue that an economic system should be organized to protect the interests of the less advantaged members of society. If free market rights should be protected, then most existing societies are unjust. These societies fail the liberal standard in the same ways as th .. (shrink)

Background The ideal basis of age estimation is considered to be a combination of clinical, skeletal and dental examinations. It is not easy to determine how forensic physicians take account of evidence-based data obtained from medical journals in their medical decision-making. The question of what is an ethically acceptable probability that adolescents are incorrectly considered to be over 18 has not been answered. Methods In a retrospective study over 1 year (2007), 498 files (for 141 female subjects and 357 male (...) subjects) regarding age assessment requested by the public prosecutor's office for purposes of criminal or asylum proceedings were reviewed. Chronological age was estimated from a combination of physical examination, radiographic examination of the left hand and determination of dental status. Results Estimates of chronological age in 498 subjects claiming to be 9–14 years old were incompatible with the alleged age in 356 (71%) when made by the forensic physician but in only 17 (3%) when based on data from published studies on age estimation in adolescents. Conclusions The present study suggests that in most cases the forensic physician ignores the adolescent's word. Medical mission and ethics imply a need to listen to the claims of persons in custody, whatever the risk of false claims. This situation should prompt forensic physicians to keep up with published data on estimating the age of adolescents. (shrink)

The elegiac poem of eight lines discovered in the Ceramicus and published by by W. Peek is of considerable interest for the historian. Peek is surely right in maintaining that it was composed for the Athenians who fell under Tolmides at Coronea in 447 B.C., and his general exposition of the poem's meaning is convincing. The aim of this paper is to make some comments and supplements to his interpretation and then to consider some peculiarities in the thought and technique (...) of the poem. We may first set out a text and a translation:λμονες ℎοῖον γṑνα μχες ελσανες λπ[ο]φσχς δαιμονṐς ṑλσα' μ πολμοισὐν κακι χσετλελεσσε βροοῖσι δ πσι λοιπνφρζεσθαι λογṐν πιοσν ἔθκε λος. (shrink)

In his choice of quotations concerning fate and the good ordering of events Stobaeus gives in succession three passages which the manuscripts ascribe to the Peleus of Euripides and the Phaedra of Sophocles, but as Wilamowitz and Nauck saw, all three form a single piece, and the ascriptions to Euripides and Sophocles do not concern them. The text so recovered may be presented as follows.

In The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gerald Gaus gives an extended argument on behalf of the “Open Society.” Instead of claiming that it is uniquely best from some privileged moral perspective, he argues for the Open Society by showing why it is acceptable to many perspectives. In this way, Gaus argues for a liberal market-based society in a way that treats deep diversity as a fundamental feature of social life. However, the argument falters at four important points. When taken together, (...) these four problems significantly limit the significance of Gaus’s conclusions. (shrink)